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27 October 1965

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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

REVIEW OF INSURGENCY PROBLEMS

This publication provides a periodic review of internal security in underdeveloped countries where there is a threat from Communist-supported insurgency.

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Office of Current Intelligence

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REVIEW OF INSURGENCY PROBLEMS

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Review of Insurgency Problems



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2. Mozambique

Portuguese military units in northwestern
Mozambique have regained the initiative from

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dissidents operating out of Tanzania and are gradually consolidating the government's control.

Recently reinforced army elements are again able to move freely through much of this territory. Two gunboats, en route to Lake Nyasa, should further reduce waterborne infiltration of men and supplies from Malawi and Tanzania.

The current Portuguese policy of concentrating friendly natives in fortified villages has seriously reduced the dissidents' sources of food and sanctuary. The Portuguese could probably limit insurgency still further in this area if they were willing to pay the high costs in personnel and material involved.

Earlier this month, Eduardo Mondlane, leader of the dissident organization--called FRELIMO--operating from a base in Tanzania, claimed that the dissidents will establish a headquarters on Mozambique soil when their control in the northern provinces is consolidated. In view of the government's improved situation, his claim now seems unrealistic.

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3. Burundi

Bujumbura is again calm in the wake of last Tuesday's abortive coup attempt by Hutu tribal members of the army and gendarmerie.


Outside the capital, scattered incidents of violence by Hutus have also reportedly subsided. These were the first known instances of rural Hutus reacting violently against the ethnic minority Tutsis for events occurring in the capital.


The government is being pressed hard by Tutsi extremists to take strong retaliatory measures against the Hutus. Some 34 coup participants have already been summarily executed. The government has also arrested several prominent Hutu leaders, including the two top officers of the National Assembly and the president of the Senate. If they are executed publicly as planned, new outbreaks of violence could occur.

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
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King Mwambutsa IV, who briefly fled to the Congo at the height of the mutiny, apparently fears another collapse of law and order. He recently sent an emissary to Leopoldville to negotiate a military pact which would provide for Congolese intervention in the event this or subsequent rebellions got out of hand. According to press reports from Europe, he is also seeking a 100-man contingent of European mercenaries for a palace guard.  (Map)

4. Colombia

Troops of the Sixth Battalion continued their campaign against the Communist-dominated guerrilla bands in the Central Cordillera between the upper valleys of the Magdalena and Cauca rivers. Government casualties have been heavy, by Colombian



Lack of contact with the enemy, the difficulties of traversing the mountainous terrain, and the realization that labor troubles and political instability have diverted public attention from its recent successes, all have combined to lower the Sixth Battalion's morale to the point where the campaign might be called off short of victory. 



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6. Peru

The Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) probably has not been permanently crippled by the 23 October army-guerrilla clash which resulted in the death of Luis de la Puente Uceda. Its southern zone of guerrilla operations, however, has suffered a severe setback--de la Puente was the southern regional commander as well as national chief of the MIR. In addition to the loss of their leader, MIR guerrillas in the south have been subjected to a two-month army siege which, if not conclusive, at least has succeeded in scattering them. [REDACTED]

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The MIR has no lack of good leaders capable of replacing de la Puente. Its organization in Lima and guerrilla units in central and northern Peru have long been under the direction of several well-trained, top-ranking MIR men. [REDACTED]

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of talent could work to the detriment of the MIR, since it may lead to a leadership struggle. De la Puente is not known to have designated any one of his lieutenants as second in command. [REDACTED]

The death of de la Puente can be described as a serious blow for the MIR and is likely to imbue the Peruvian Army with new spirit and confidence. Army morale had been steadily declining during recent weeks due to the frustrations of the long and inconclusive antiguerrilla campaign. The army is now expected to turn its attention toward the central zone guerrillas. [REDACTED]

Despite the setback in the south, the MIR appears to have gained considerable support from other Communist and extreme leftist groups in Peru. If this trend continues, the strength and threat of the far left will be dangerously increased. The MIR itself has provided the impetus for this development. [REDACTED]

When the MIR initiated its guerrilla campaign last June, it had no support from any other Communist or leftist organization. This was true partly because none would submit to total domination by the MIR, a long-standing condition of union with that organization. In addition, not all Peruvian Communists were ready to concede that guerrilla warfare was the correct revolutionary path to power. [REDACTED]

During the past five months, the MIR's demonstrated ability to conduct limited guerrilla warfare, despite military pursuit, has captured the attention of the nation. Far leftist groups, although closely observing these developments, at first held back from offering any but propaganda support for the guerrillas. As the MIR campaign continued, it succeeded in both attracting and forcing increased sympathy from the far left, particularly among youth elements. [REDACTED]

The Army of National Liberation (ELN) was the first group to join with the MIR to form a National Command of Coordination. Although the ELN is a relatively small group, about 40 of its members have received extensive guerrilla training in Cuba.

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The 26 September attack on a hacienda in Apurimac Department, resulting in the death of its owners, has been attributed to the ELN. The second MIR affiliate, announced in September, was the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN). Almost nothing is known about this new group, but it is presumed to be made up of dissident youths from both the pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions of the Peruvian Communist Youth (JCP). Many JCP members of both factions have been dissatisfied with their parent organizations over their apparent indifference to the MIR.

Other groups, while not directly affiliated with the MIR, have openly declared active support. These include the Front of National Liberation (FLN), now independent but originally a Communist Party front organization, and two small Trotskyite parties.

7. Venezuela

Venezuelan authorities on 16 October captured six important members of the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN)

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[redacted] Coupled with the capture of at least 100 FALN members in the Maturin region in September and the arrest on 18 October of the FALN's top commander, Alberto Lovera, this development could cause a prolonged cessation of FALN terrorist and guerrilla activities in eastern Venezuela. On 22 October, the government announced the capture near Barcelona, Anzoategui, of a "huge cache of war material," the source of that used in the dynamiting of US-owned oil pipelines on 11 October.

[redacted]

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While the traditional areas of guerrilla activity in western and eastern Venezuela remained relatively quiet, guerrilla activity unexpectedly broke out in north-central Venezuela. On 22 October, 20 armed men, probably an FALN detachment, attacked the town of San Jose de Tiznados, Guarico, about 75 miles south of Caracas. The band disarmed the prefect and three policemen, locked them in jail, harangued the citizens, and sacked several stores.

[redacted]

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
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
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